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2.3 Medical accidents
The seven cases of medical accidents can be classified into three groups: premature babies
whose eyes are scorched by incubator oxygen, diagnostic errors and cataract operations.
The cases are almost equally distributed between the First Chamber (three cases) and the
Third (four cases), which, once again, illustrates the likely mistake of dividing the same
task – judging medical malpractice – between two different chambers. InDret now has
sufficient empirical grounds to argue that jurisdictional authority based upon the personal
status of defendants is not in fact preferable to one based on the type of activity they carry
out and the harm they cause: as in the case of education centers, it does not make sense to
distinguish between the public and private sectors when dealing with medical or hospital-
based accidents.
This is particularly apparent in two cases of retrolental fibroplasia, a bilateral eye disease
of premature new-borns that leads to blindness due to the abnormal growth of the eye’s
blood vessels and which particularly affects babies of low birth weight. One of these was
settled by the First Chamber (STS 6.5.1998) and the other by the Third (STS 10.2.1998): in
the former, the First Chamber, which in theory decides in accordance with a criterion of
negligence, ordered INSALUD (the Spanish National Health Service) to pay compensation
of 60,000,000 pts. over the blindness caused to a baby born prematurely at 32 weeks and
who then spent 56 days in an incubator; in the latter, however, the Third Chamber – which
in theory decides much more in accordance with a standard of strict liability – absolved the
same body on the grounds that there was no demonstrable causal relationship between the
oxygen given to a baby born prematurely at 31 weeks, who then spent 40 days in an
incubator, and his subsequent blindness. The actual difference between the cases is frankly
non-existent: the jurisdictional division is clearly inefficient as it duplicates the activity and
prejudices legal certainty. The only important difference between the cases is perhaps the
number of days that each premature baby spent in an incubator.
Finally, and with respect to these two cases, it is interesting to note that the Third Chamber
drew upon the cliché of causality in order to settle a case according to the classic terms of
negligence.
Of the three cases of medical negligence resulting from diagnostic errors (STS, 1st,
10.11.1999; STS, 3rd, 9.3.1998 and STS, 3rd, 26.3.1999), the first two are quite clear-cut: in the
first (STS 10.11.1999), the First Chamber ordered the patient’s ophthalmologist and
insurance company to pay, jointly, compensation of 13,080,000 pts. for loss of sight in one
eye caused by a copper splinter that had gone undetected for four years (!); and in the
second (STS 9.3.1998), the Third Chamber ordered INSALUD to compensate a patient who
lost an eye due to a metal splinter that was not detected until 11 months after he was first
examined. It is interesting to note that in both cases the injury was caused by the presence
of a foreign body in the eye and that this could have been easily avoided, at low cost, had
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the patient been x-rayed. In the other case (STS, 26.3.1999), the Third Chamber ordered the
Administración General del Estado (general government administration) to pay compensation
of 10,000,000 pts. to an ex-flying instructor of the Academia General del Aire (national pilots
academy). For thirty years he was told he had shrapnel in his skull when in fact it was
residue of the contrast material used in the myelographies he had after a flying accident in
1960. In 1990 he was diagnosed with cerebrospinal arachnoiditis, an illness that was to
make him blind.
Finally, two simple cataract operations caused, in one case (STS, 1st, 2.11.1999), loss of sight
in one eye and, in the other (STS, 1st, 9.12.1999), loss of an eye. In the first, the SC ordered
the patient’s ophthalmologist and insurance company to pay, jointly, compensation of
20,000,000 pts., while in the second it ordered INSALUD to pay 11,496,050 pts. to the 58-
year-old patient.
2.4 Police conduct
The six cases of eye injuries resulting from police conduct or the behavior of the injured
party himself – or both these – are also settled by both criminal (3 cases) and contentious-
administrative jurisdiction (4 cases): the latter deals with injuries caused when riot police
break up demonstrations or move in to control street violence while criminal jurisdiction
covers cases of individual police conduct, such as a struggle between an officer and the
person he is trying to detain. InDret has already addressed the question of liability with
respect to police conduct in Policías que disparan (police who shoot).
From an outsider’s point of view, the division of cases into two groups and their settlement
under two jurisdictions would seem to reflect the following stereotype: criminal
jurisdiction deals with those police excesses which are person to person whereas
contentious-administrative jurisdiction resolves conflicts arising from organized police
action to break up or control groups of demonstrators or rioters. Thus, it is difficult for the
reader of this case law to know if the distinguishing criterion used by the SC’s criminal and
contentious –administrative judges is really the principle of fault and the traditional
demand for individual liability, or whether, when a number of police officers act in unison,
and regardless of what then occurs, individual liability is excluded and liability over the
events in question is given to the Administración Central del Estado (central government
body).
It is interesting to note that in the three criminal cases concerning person to person police
excesses the victims’ eye injuries were mild (bruising): confrontation with a citizen
accused of breach of the peace in which a police officer hit him in the eye (STS, 2nd,
29.9.1998); officer who, without reason, hit a 16-year-old boy caught writing graffiti who,
after escaping from the police, gave himself up (STS, 2nd, 1.12.1998); sex attacker who
suffered several mild injuries to the neck, chest and one eye while resisting arrest (STS, 2nd,
1.7.1998).
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In three of the four contentious-administrative cases, the eye injuries resulted from the use
of rubber bullets by officers against demonstrators (STS, 3rd, 20.1.1998: a 15-year-old
demonstrator was awarded 7,000,000 pts over loss of an eye; STS, 3rd, 18.10.1999: a
demonstrator who was left practically blind in one eye following a confrontation with a
police officer after a demonstration had been broken up saw his claim for compensation
rejected) or were caused to a third party who happened to be on the scene (STS, 3rd,
27.1.1998: person in Vitoria who lost an eye whilst waiting in a bar for violent disturbances
to clear). Only in one case (STS, 3rd, 21.12.1998) did a man involved in an (unauthorized)
demonstration suffer eye injuries (detached retina leading to cataracts) as a consequence of
the use of water jets by security forces.
Given the average or normal diameter of the cranial cavity protecting the eyeball it must be
asked whether the type or model of anti-riot equipment used by the police could be
substituted by another which is equally effective in breaking up disturbances but less
dangerous in terms of its potential for causing eye injuries. However, we do not have
statistics on the type or number of rubber bullets that were acquired and used effectively
by law and order forces during the period in which the above-mentioned events took place.
In two of the cited cases (SSTS 21.12.1998 and 18.10.1999), the Third Chamber also used the
criterion of lack of illegality with respect to the injury in order to charge the victims with
creating hazardous situations, and thus responsibility for the outcome.
2.5 Fireworks
The three cases of firework accidents which occurred during public festivities were settled
indiscriminately by the First and Third Chambers of the SC: boy who lost an eye when he
was struck by a rocket stick which landed among the people watching the display (STS, 1st,
8.10.1996); man who, during public festivities involving “cart throwing” (not officially
organized although with the permission of the Town Council) suffered a burnt conjunctiva
in one eye after being struck by a firework which landed beyond the fence that had been
erected for the display (STS, 1st, 21.7.1998); person who lost an eye after being struck by a
firework during local festivities in El Pardo (STS, 3rd, 15.12.1997). Only in the second case
was the plaintiff denied compensation. The reason is clear: whoever accepts the inherent
risk of a situation, such as approaching an area where fireworks are being set off, must bear
liability for the injurious outcome. In other words, the injury is not an example of illegality.
Finally, one should again note the jurisdictional conflict: in STS 21.7.1998, civil jurisdiction
heard the suit against a public administrative body without even considering its lack of
authority.
2.6 Sport
The two cases of eye injuries sustained during sporting activity do not enable strong
conclusions to be drawn. Without prejudice to the fact that sports injuries will have to be
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dealt with by InDret in the future, it is, nevertheless, worth pointing out that there is a
difference between sports such as football (STS, 1st, 12.11.1997), that do not normally entail
a risk of eye injuries, and activities such as hunting (STS, 1st, 12.3.1998). However, the
exclusion of liability in the first case – in which a teenage club footballer suffered an intense
and persistent loss of visual acuity in one eye after being struck by another player’s elbow
during training – is due to the fact that the Spanish SC decided that the action could not
continue due to the statute of limitation.
2.7 Workplace accidents
The five cases of workplace injuries that reached the Spanish SC during the period under
study again illustrate the problem of jurisdiction, some being settled by the civil chamber
and others the social one. This and other issues, such as the level of compatibility between
compensation for damages and social security benefits, have been analyzed by InDret in
Accidentes de Trabajo y Responsabilidad Civil (Workplace Injuries and Civil Liability), and
the reader wishing to follow the debate on the current state of the question and the
advantages and disadvantages of this state of affairs should refer to this text. In addition,
two further cases are worth highlighting: in the first (STS, 1st, 4.4.1997), a truck driver who
was already blind in one eye lost his other eye when the jacuzzi he was unloading fell on
top of him; in the second (STS, 4th, 17.2.1999), a locksmith lost the sight of one eye when a
metal splinter flew off from a plate he was removing from a taxi.
2.8 Defective products
In manufacturer’s civil liability, a distinction is made between manufacturing defects,
design faults and defective instructions and warnings (Defectos que dañan [Defects that
harm]).
For the period under study the only instance of an eye injury in which case law deemed the
manufacturer to be civilly liable (STS, 1st, 3.12.1997) – occurring before the transposition of
Directive 85/374/CEE1 by Law 22/19942 - both the Audiencia Provincial (A.P.) (regional
court) and the Spanish SC argued that the injury was due to a defect in the instructions for
a cutting machine (insufficient information), the use of which caused the serious loss of
sight in one of the operator’s eyes: the SC upheld the award of 10,000,000 pts. imposed by
the A.P. upon the import company on the basis of art. 1902 CC and art. 27.2 of the Ley
General de Defensa de los Consumidores y Usuarios (general consumer protection law)3.
Furthermore, the SC cited, as a legal basis for its decision, Directive 85/374/EEC.
                                                       
1 Council Directive 85/374/CEE, of 25 July, concerning the alignment of the Member States’
legal, regulatory and administrative provisions with respect to injuries caused by defective
products.
2 Law 22/1994, of 6 July, on civil liability over injuries caused by defective products (B.O.E num.
161, of 7 July).
3 Law 26/1984, of 19 July, General para la Defensa de los Consumidores y Usuarios (general
consumer protection law) (B.O.E. num. 176, of 24 July).
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· Where are we going and where should we be?
This paper’s conclusions are of a politico-legal nature and InDret can make proposals for
the legal and judicial management of eye injuries as the work basically concerns case law:
its empirical basis is solely cassation rulings of the Spanish Supreme Court.
1. In drawing the first conclusion, it is useful to start by distinguishing between easily-
avoided accidents and those which are not. The forty-seven rulings under study
illustrate that there are some situations in which the frequency of accidents leading to
eye injuries could be reduced at no great cost whilst other accidents are practically
unavoidable.
There are different long and short-term solutions – some easier to implement than
others – to some of the cases studied. For example, one cannot feasibly imagine a child
being stopped from unexpectedly using the pencil with which he is writing to injure
another child unless, of course, the use of pencils itself is prohibited. However, the
same child can be stopped from playing with sticks, stones or fireworks, thus making
schools safer places to be in; and, in more general terms, such premises can be properly
fenced off and well-maintained. Some eye injuries caused in public disturbances when
there is a clash between demonstrators and riot police could also be avoided if, for
example, the latter had effective control measures available which posed less danger to
eyeballs than rubber bullets do. Similarly, workplace injuries caused when the
employer fails to implement any safety measures or the worker does not follow those
which are in place could also be avoided. It is more difficult, however, to propose
short-term solutions to reduce the number of eye injuries resulting from fights or
assaults involving adults, and the part that alcohol plays in these: in the long term,
more civic education would seem to be a suitable option for preventing this type of
accident. In the medium term, it would be helpful to find ways of discouraging people
from using potentially harmful substances such as alcohol.
2. The second issue which should be highlighted in this group of cases is that the same
kind of accident is judged by different jurisdictions and according to different rules. In
terms of dealing with the same kind of accident there are two plausible solutions:
a) Giving exclusive authority to civil jurisdiction would bring the advantages of
the division of work and specialization over the matter in question, as has been
argued by other InDret authors (Accidentes de trabajo y responsabilidad civil
[Workplace injuries and civil liability]). However, this would not avoid the
extra costs that would be incurred through the duplication of processes – civil
and criminal – when either the eye injury in question constitutes a crime or
offence under criminal law, or when civil jurisdiction is not specialized enough
to adjudicate with regard to public services should the accident occur within
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the context of labor relations. A further obstacle that this proposal would have
to overcome is that the contentious-administrative order would have exclusive
cognizance with respect to public health care, in accordance with D.A. 12th
LRJAP4.
b) Another solution would be to unify applicable law and maintain the plurality of
jurisdictions. This would mean creating a basic system of civil liability for both
criminal and civil offences. With respect to workplace injuries, the reader
should again refer to Accidentes de trabajo y responsabilidad civil (Workplace
injuries and civil liability) where this issue is discussed. The unification of tort
law for civil and administrative offences requires a separate study which InDret
will undertake in future articles.
3. Although there are many exceptions the basic liability standard in civil law continues
to be that of negligence (art. 1902 CC) and the First Chamber of the Spanish SC settles
cases in accordance with this. However, the common standard in government liability
is strict liability, something which is made clear by the SC’s Third Chamber in its
resolutions.
The third conclusion of this paper thus concerns the position already adopted
elsewhere by InDret (Causalidad y Responsabilidad [Causality and Liability]), namely
that the least one can say about the distinction between negligence and strict liability is
that the two categories overlap; as we have seen above, the basic judgement of
negligence issued by the First Chamber is clearly omitted by the Third, but reappears in
the guise of illegality or causality. In fact, the strong similarities between the criteria
applied by both Chambers is at times obscured behind semantic differences. A future
task for jurists is to overcome this traditional division of areas, each with its own
jargon, and develop theoretical and doctrinal models that eliminate such differences.
This observation, reiterated throughout this paper, not only adds weight to the
previous conclusion but enables a further one to be drawn: a new category of strict
liability, in the exact sense, could be developed and defined on the basis of two
characteristics:
a) The carrying out of dangerous activities, or those which are typical in legal
terms, or through reference to specific people or groups of people.
b) The activity in question is deemed to be harmful according to purely
objective/scientific criteria.
                                                       
4 Modified by art. 2.3 of Law 4/1999, of 13 January, from modification of the Ley de Régimen
Jurídico de la Administración Pública y del Procedimiento Administrativo Común (law on public
administration and common administrative procedure) (B.O.E. nº 12, of 14 January).
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These areas, to which a system of strict liability would be applied, could be
distinguished from those others in which the imputation of liability is based exclusively
on the legal decision to offer third party insurance to certain groups of people and for
certain kinds of injury, for example, serious or improbable cases, or both of these
together.
In terms of who should pay the premiums on such insurance it seems unlikely that a
single solution will be appropriate for all the groups of cases analyzed in this paper: it
seems reasonable – if not obvious – to argue that the solution in the case of medical or
school accidents should not be the same as in the case of domestic accidents.
4. There do not seem to be significant differences in the amount of compensation finally
awarded or validated by the different chambers of the Spanish SC for similar cases and
any discrepancies are usually due to differences in the facts of the case or, especially,
the age of the different victims. However, there are indeed important differences when
these compensation awards are compared with that which would have been awarded
had legal schedules been applied. In any case, neither the compensation awarded by
the courts nor that which would have been awarded through applying legal schedules
are excessively high, especially when one considers that many of the victims are
children or young people. However, whatever the amount of compensation awarded
by the courts may be, the idea that it be provided through a non-capitalizable pension
given to the victim or his or her legal representatives, as occurred in STS, 1st, 3.7.1998,
is, from a legal point of view, debatable and, what’s more, costly to manage.
5. In the almost fifty cases settled by the Spanish SC in the four-year period under study
there is one kind of case which is conspicuous by its absence: the domestic accident
which occurs in a family environment, in relationships between parents and children
and close relatives, or when friends and/or neighbors do favors for each other.
InDret in no way wishes to do away with the unwritten privilege of domestic
relationships, but would like to draw attention to the frequency of these accidents and
the benefits that could be derived from developing education and healthcare policies
that helped to reduce them, without this increasing the cost of being a parent and, in
turn, having a negative effect on the birth rate.
· Two representative rulings
To finish, InDret would like to highlight two notable cases. The first, Helling v. Carey (83
Wn.2d 514, 519 P.2d 981), clearly illustrates the best and the worst – or to put it another
way, the limits – of the economic analysis of law. The second, STS, 1st, 18.10.1999, whose
rapporteur was Jesús Corbal Fernández, is the most carefully founded Spanish SC case for
the period under study.
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1. Helling v. Carey
In Helling v. Carey, the plaintiff, Barbara Helling, showed, at the age of thirty-two,
symptoms of open-angle glaucoma, a serious disease that can lead to blindness. A simple
eye pressure test carried out in childhood could, in the year in which the facts of the case
took place (1968), detect the disease and thus prevent its development. Glaucoma is not a
common disease and its symptoms appear in only 1 in 25,000 people under the age of forty.
The defendants, the ophthalmologists Thomas F. Carey and Robert C. Laughlin, had
treated the plaintiff for myopia since she was a child but, given the rarity of the disease, did
not carry out the test in question on patients under forty, this being in line with
professional standards. The plaintiff developed the disease and the adjudicator thus had to
decide whether, despite the fact that medical standards of the time did not oblige doctors to
carry out the test in question on people under forty, the defendants had been negligent,
that is to say, had not, at the time, taken reasonable precautions to prevent harm to the
patient.
For the last fifty years the economic analysis of tort law has been governed by the use of
Hand’s formula, B = P x L, that is to say, in order for a defendant to be absolved the
economic cost of the precautions (B) that he or she must take should be equal to or greater
than the economic cost of likely harm (P x L). In this case, it is known that the probability of
developing the disease is P = 1/25,000 and also that the cost of the test which should have
been used to reduce harm was minimal. The only unknown, therefore, is the economic
estimate of the harm in question, L: what is an eye worth? The ruling was condemnatory
because L was understood to be greater than the product of 25,000 multiplied by the cost –
not recorded in the case – of the eye pressure test, the court not stating how it arrived at a
precise figure for L. The interested reader should refer to Robert COOTER’S discussion of the
case (Robert COOTER and Thomas ULEN, 1988, p.377).
2. STS, 1st, 18.10.1999
The case settled by STS, 1st, 18.10.1999, concerned a group of children at summer camp who
were playing with sticks, one of them losing an eye upon being hit by another. The injured
boy’s father filed suit against the parents of the boy who had thrown the stick, the teacher
who was supervising them and the Department of Education of the Generalitat de Catalunya
(Catalan regional government). The plaintiff asked that the defendants be ordered jointly
to: a) pay a life pension – to the value of 30,000,000 pts., or the amount decided by the court
– for loss of an eye and other sequelae; b) pay all medical and opticians’ costs, to a total of
242,800 pts.; and c) be liable to pay the injured party’s costs in terms of future curative
treatments, including any operations that may become possible as a result of new
techniques.
Civil jurisdiction was declared to have authority over the case and the first instance court
in Gandesa ordered the Generalitat de Catalunya alone to pay compensation of 177,200 pts.
for medical costs, 6,000,000 pts. for the sequelae, and to be liable for payment of whatever
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sums were deemed necessary in passing sentence in terms of the injured party’s health and
rehabilitation of the lost eye. Both the plaintiff and the Generalitat de Catalunya appealed,
the father of the boy who caused the injury adhering to this process over the matter of
costs. The A.P. of Tarragona partially upheld the plaintiff’s appeal and raised the amount
of compensation for loss of an eye to 10,000,000 pts., taking into account both physical and
psychological sequelae as well as cosmetic damage.
The Generalitat de Catalunya and the plaintiff applied for cassation. The former alleged,
under article 1692.4 of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil (LEC)[rules of civil law procedure],
then in force, that there was an infringement of jurisprudence with respect to the effects of
criminal acquittals in civil procedure. The Spanish SC argued that the criminal decision had
not denied the facts which constituted the grounds for a civil claim, only their criminal-
legal relevance. Secondly, the appellant alleged lack of negligence and, therefore,
infringement due to arts. 1902 and 1903 CC being inappropriately applied. The injury was
argued to be accidental and STS, 1st, 21.11.1990, - in which the loss of an eye when one boy
attacked another with a fork was deemed to be accidental - was cited in support. With
good reason, the judge distinguished between an almost unavoidable accident in a dining
room of twenty-four children – who, in our culture, are carefully brought up to eat with
cutlery rather than their hands – and a dangerous game played in the open air. Every
teacher knows that children like to play with sticks and stones, but also that as much as
possible should be done to discourage them from doing so. This ruling summarizes, at the
end of the third fundamental point of law – and with excellent grounds – the best doctrine
on the issue of dangerous games to come out of First Chamber case law in Spain. The judge
takes particular care in describing the group of cases in which such games featured:
“The dangerous nature of the activity or game is especially evident in SS 10 Jun.
1983 – children playing at throwing stones -; 10 Nov. 1990 – a form of hopscotch
where, instead of a stone, a file or knife is thrown-; 3 Dec. 1991 –crossbow with a
pin -; 20 May. 1993 – a punctured, misshapen ball of hard plastic -; 30 Jun. 1995 –
two children playing with air rifles -; 10 Dec. 1996 – broach with pin -; and 17 Sep.
1998 – playing with catapults –“ (F.D. 3rd).
InDret hopes that this ruling’s example will be followed, but knows only too well that such
work is costly.
The plaintiff had stated, firstly, that there was an infringement of art. 1137 CC in relation to
arts. 1903 and 1902 CC, under art. 1692.4 LEC. The SC rejected both the reference to article
1137 CC – on the grounds that there was not more than one liable party – and to articles
1902 and 1903 CC, because the statement made an assumption of the matter. The courts of
instance rejected any personal liability of the teacher who was being sued and the First
Chamber refused to review the facts of the case. In his second statement the appellant had
also challenged the ruling of the A.P., contrary to that of the first instance court, with
respect to the third petition of his claim, that is to say, payment of future curative
treatments, including operations that may be possible as a result of technological advances.
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The Spanish SC, in its fifth fundamental point of law, rejected this argument on the
following grounds:
“One cannot speculate, without a current scientific basis, on what may be possible
or foreseeable in the future in terms of the advancements of medical science, this
not being consistent with legal certainty”.
At the same time the SC stressed that the amount of compensation can only be reviewed
when the following requisites are in place:
“Legal rules contradict each other, the required concepts or bases are not respected,
there are either inconsistencies, a patent error, arbitrariness or an irrational
argument (that which has no logical grounds), which was not deemed to have
occurred in this case”.
Finally, in his third statement, the appellant had argued, under art. 1692.4 LEC, that there
was an infringement of art. 1903 CC in relation to art. 921.4 LEC, with respect to the interest
from legal proceedings being omitted from the rulings of the first instance court and the
A.P. The SC rejected this because, under the last paragraph of art. 921 LEC, any legal
interest will only be due three months after non-payment by the relevant administration.
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1st, 18.10.1999 7615 Jesús Corbal Fernández Father of José Pablo A.S. v. parents of
Antoni F.B., Juan F.B. & Departament
d’Ensenyament de la Generalitat de
Catalunya (Education Dept. of
Catalonian government)
1st, 2.11.1999 7998 Alfonso Villagómez
Rodil
Luis S.M. v. Saúl V. & insurance
company “Adeslas, S.A.”
1st, 10.11.1999 8057 Román García Varela Laura C.P. v. Javier U.B. & “Mutua
Vizcaya Industrial”
1st, 9.12.1999 9173 Román García Varela Antonia J.J. v. Miguel J., Purificación
G.D., Gabriel P.C., Francisco F.M. &
Andalusian Health Service
2nd, 23.4.1996 2922 Cándido Conde-
Pumpido Tourón
Boat captain v. Carlos Alberto C.F. &
“Pescaderías de Cádiz, S.A.”
2nd, 14.4.1998 4024 José Antonio Martín
Pallín
José Luis M.I. v. Enrico P.
2nd, 8.7.1998 5814 José Antonio Martín
Pallín
María Guadalupe G.L., José Luis P.S.,
Fidel T. De L.; José Manuel G.H., María
Clara G.H v. José V.G., María Esther
R.R. & Tomás Indalecio V.G.
2nd, 29.9.1998 8033 Roberto García-Calvo y
Montiel
Suk Jae L.Ch. v. Miguel R.G.
2nd, 8957 Joaquín Delgado García Gabriel P. v. Antonio P.A. & Miguel






8985 Joaquín Delgado García Antonio Javier A.D. v. Jorge Manuel
S.G.
2nd, 1.12.1998 9408 Luis-Román Puerta Luis Legal representative of Jesús E.L. v.
Ricardo M.G.
2nd, 11.2.1999 854 Joaquín Delgado García Manuel R. & Felipe R. v. Mª. del Carmen
B.B.
2nd, 8.4.1999 2776 Cándido Conde-
Pumpido Tourón
María Paz V. v. Julita V.R.
2nd, 21.4.1999 2786 Joaquín Martín Canivell Estíbaliz C.B. v. José Manuel V.S. &
Ainhoa C.V.
2nd, 29.5.1999 3567 Enrique Bacigalupo
Zapater
Santiago R.C. & legal heirs of Andrés S.E
v. Julio César E.B.
2nd, 28.6.1999 6109 José Manuel Martínez-
Pereda Rodríguez
Ministerio Fiscal v. Javier Eduardo M.V.
& Cristina C.M.
2nd, 1.7.1999 5806 José Manuel Martínez-
Pereda Rodríguez
Héctor José G.G. v. Agustín H.A.,
Manuel S.G. & Francisco O.G.
2nd, 8.10.1999 8117 José Augusto de Vega
Ruiz
Javier D. V. Adolfo G.D.
2nd,
30.11.1999
8728 José Antonio Martín
Pallín
Miguelina N.P. v. Rafael B.C.
3rd, 12.2.1996 1074 Luis Tejada González Father of Santos M.C. v. Andújar Town
Council & Delegación Provincial de Jaén
(regional council)




9357 Juan José González
Rivas
Actor v. Ayuntamiento de Madrid (City
Council)
3rd, 20.1.1998 350 Juan Antonio Xiol Ríos Legal representative of Rafael Z.P. v.
Administración General del Estado
3rd, 27.1.1998 575 Pedro Antonio Mateos
García
Francisco Manuel L.D. v.
Administración General del Estado
3rd, 10.2.1998 1452 Juan José González
Rivas
Parents of Juan Antonio B.T. v.
INSALUD
3rd, 9.3.1998 2656 Juan José González
Rivas







Manuel L.B. v. Administración General
del Estado
3rd, 16.2.1999 1622 Juan Antonio Xiol Ríos Parents of Elisabeth S.A. v. Generalitat
de Catalunya (regional government)
3rd, 26.3.1999 3164 Francisco González
Navarro
Jesús María A.M. v. Administración
General del Estado
3rd, 8679 Francisco González Jesús Emilio C.G. v. Administración
InDret 04/2000 Pablo Salvador, Sonia Ramos, Álvaro Luna
16
18.10.1999 Navarro General del Estado
4th,
31.10.1996
7806 Luis Gil Suárez Jesús G.N. v. “Mutua de Papel, Prensa y
Artes Gráficas”
4th, 28.1.1998 1145 Luis Gil Suárez Javier A.D. v. “Mutuamur”, «Perfox,
S.L.” & INSS
4th, 17.2.1999 2598 Fernando Salinas
Molina
Vicente N.P. v. “Mutua Madrileña de
Taxis”
5th, 19.7.1999 8193 Carlos García Lozano Miguel Ángel F.F. v. David M.R.
Rulings from the United States of America
Case Year Reference
Helling v. Carey 1974 (83 Wn.2d 514, 519 P.2d 981)
